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Abstract 
The negative features of false memories are frequently at the foreground of false memory 
research. However, it has become increasingly apparent that false memories also have 
positive consequences. In two experiments, we examined the positive consequences of false 
memories. Participants were visually presented with false memory word lists and received a 
recognition task. In a modified perceptual closure test, participants received degraded visual 
representations of words (false, true, and unrelated items) that became clearer over time. 
Participants had to identify them as fast as possible. Identifications based on false memories 
were significantly faster than those based on true memories and (un)related items. A roughly 
similar pattern was observed when no recognition task was used and when critical lures were 
replaced with other items (Experiment 2). Our results indicate that false memories can be 
beneficial for problem-solving tasks and counter the standard perspective that false memories 
are inherently negative in nature.  
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The Positive Ramifications of False Memories using a Perceptual Closure Task 
The imperfections of memory have often served as the cornerstone of current 
experimental memory research (Loftus, 2005). What most of this research shows is that our 
memory is prone to the formation of illusions or so-called false memories. The reason that 
false memories have received so much empirical attention is because of their foreboding 
reputation in the legal arena. That is, false memories of traumatic events (e.g., sexual abuse) 
have resulted in legal proceedings in which innocent people were brought to trial (Garven, 
Wood, Malpass, & Shaw, 1998). The principal purpose of the current experiment was to 
examine whether false memories can have salutary consequences as well. To address this 
issue, we made use of a task linked to intelligence (i.e., picture completion).   
Although mainstream false memory research has contributed much to the debate on 
the negative effects of false memories (Otgaar, Sauerland, & Petrila, 2013), less scientific 
knowledge is available on whether false memories are also positive and adaptive. To examine 
this hypothesis, some researchers have investigated the link between false memories and 
priming performance on related memory tasks. In a typical false memory priming 
experiment, participants are presented with lists of semantic associates (i.e., DRM lists; 
Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). After the presentation of the lists, participants 
receive tasks that tap into implicit memory (e.g., stem completion). The basic result is that the 
presentation of lists of associates primes the non-presented theme word (i.e., critical lure) on 
implicit memory tasks and that, therefore, participants completing such tasks report the 
critical lure (Diliberto-Macaluso, 2005; McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 2000).  
Perhaps somewhat more germane is work that has looked at false memory production 
and subsequent performance on non-memory, problem-solving tasks.  For example, Howe, 
Garner, Dewhurst, and Ball (2010) presented adults with lists of associatively-related words 
(e.g., web, insect, bug, fly; DRM lists) known to elicit false memories (i.e., spider). 
Following presentation of these lists, participants were given a memory test and then had to 
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solve compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems.  Here, three words are provided to 
participants (e.g., widow, bite, house) and they must come up with a single word (in this case, 
spider) that when combined with each of the first three, provides meaningful phrases. 
Importantly, the non-presented critical lures of the DRM lists served as the solution to some 
of these CRATS. The chief finding was that when participants falsely recalled critical lures, 
CRAT problems were solved more frequently and significantly faster than when problems 
were not primed by DRM lists. These findings have been replicated with children (Howe, 
Garner, Charlesworth, & Knott, 2011) and extended to proportional analogies (Howe, 
Threadgold, Norbury, Garner, & Ball, 2013).  Finally, Howe, Garner, and Patel (2013) 
showed that survival-related false memories serve as better primes for solving problem-
solving tasks than neutral false memories. 
In the current study, we were interested in whether false memories might have 
positive ramifications in another unique domain. That is, one limitation of using CRATs is 
that although they are non-memory-based problem tasks, they still resemble the procedure of 
a standard DRM procedure. Specifically, in a CRAT, participants also receive words that are 
related to a non-presented word just as in the DRM procedure. So, our purpose was to 
examine whether the salutary effects of false memories can also be demonstrated in problems 
linked to intelligence  (e.g., picture completion).  To be more specific, we examined whether 
false memories could prime solutions on an adapted perceptual closure task thereby mirroring 
a picture completion task. Second, like Howe et al. (2013), our interest was whether this 
effect would differ when the emotional aspect of the lists was varied. Using this 
methodology, our study has the potential to deliver novel insight into the adaptive nature of 
memory illusions and the robustness of earlier findings herein.  
Examining false memory priming effects in the realm of intelligence is interesting 
because intelligence has been considered to be essential for survival (Kanazawa, 2012; Roth 
& Dicke, 2005). Intelligence can be broadly defined as the speed at which species solve 
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problems in their environment. It is obvious from this definition that examining the positive 
effects of false memories can be fruitful when relating it to intelligence. If one were to find 
positive consequences of false memories on tasks linked to intelligence, it would generalize 
the finding that false memories can have positive effects in a substantial manner. Our intent 
was to examine this question by using a perceptual closure task (Snodgrass & Kinjo, 1998).  
Perceptual closure refers to the process where a person fills in missing parts of a degraded 
stimulus in order to complete an image and create a clear object. In a perceptual closure task, 
participants are presented with degraded stimuli that become less degraded over time. 
Participants are asked to indicate as soon as possible what the stimuli represent. Of 
significance for the current experiment is that this task parallels subtasks in certain 
intelligence tasks (e.g., Luteijn & Barelds, 2004). That is, in certain intelligence subtests (i.e., 
picture completion), participants have to identify degraded pictures as fast as possible. In our 
experiment, we made use of this idea and developed an adapted perceptual closure task. 
Participants were presented with DRM lists and received a recognition task. After the 
recognition task, participants were shown degraded non-presented and presented words. 
Their instruction was to indicate if they recognized the word and state which word it entailed. 
Our expectation was that false memories would result in equally fast or even faster solution 
rates relative to true memories (Howe et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, in the present methodology, we included both neutral and negative 
DRM lists. Negatively-charged material is often more susceptible to false memory creation 
than more mundane material (Otgaar, Candel, & Merckelbach, 2008) and, hence, one could 
expect that false memory priming effects are larger for negatively-laden material.. However, 
one could also anticipate that negative false memories are not better primes on a perceptual 
closure task than neutral false memories. That is, research shows that affective information 
can lead to a reduction in false memories, which might lead to smaller priming effects (e.g., 
Storbeck & Clore, 2005). According to this scenario, a reduction in negative false memories 
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might make them less available to be used during the perceptual closure task, thereby 
leading to slower solution rates.  
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 43 adult participants (Mage = 20.50, SD = 1.60; range: 18-27 years; 6 male) 
were involved in the current experiment. Students were awarded course credits or a financial 
compensation for their participation (€7.50). As a requirement, participants were not allowed 
to have participated in a similar memory-related study. The experiment was approved by the 
standing ethical committee of the Faculty of Psychology of Neuroscience, Maastricht 
University. 
Materials and Tasks 
 In the current experiment, presentation of the DRM words in all tasks (perceptual 
closure and recognition) was done visually. All tasks were digitalized on a Microsoft 
Windows computer, and presented with E-Prime 2.0 software. Single words from each 
wordlist were recreated as digital representations that contained a white background with the 
word centered in black. These representations were created using Adobe Photoshop CS6, 
with the words displayed in font “Calibri”, size “125pt”. All words were presented in Dutch. 
All participants were presented with three consecutive tasks: (1) a digitalized DRM 
wordlist task including 10 counterbalanced standard DRM lists (5 neutral and 5 negative) 
with 10 words each (e.g., baker, butter, crust, grain) and each list was associated with a non-
presented critical lure (i.e., bread). These lists have been used in previous research (e.g., 
Otgaar, Peters, & Howe, 2012). List items were chosen from the Dutch word association 
norms (Van Loon-Vervoorn & Van Bekkum, 1991) and were shown in order of backward 
associative strength, from strongest to weakest. We also guaranteed that the mean word 
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frequency of the neutral and emotional critical lures did not differ, t(8) = 0.22, p > .05, by 
using the CELEX lexical database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & Gulikers, 1995). Also, the mean 
backward associative strength between the neutral list words and their critical lures and the 
mean backward associative strength between the negative items and their critical lures did not 
differ, t(8) = 1.69, p > .05. Words were presented for 1500 ms and between each word a 
fixation cross appeared for 1 s., (2) a digitalized DRM recognition task, consisting of 78 
words in total, of which 40 were studied during the presentation of the DRM lists (4 from 
each list), 10 critical lures (1 from each list), 10 non-presented related words (i.e., words 
related to the lists, not presented during encoding) and 18 non-presented and unrelated words. 
Words were presented for 1500 ms and after each word a white slide appeared for 200 ms, 
followed by a pop-up window in which participants had to answer “yes” or “no” in a self-
paced manner, and (3) a digitalized perceptual closure task, containing 80 words in total of 
which 40 overlapped with the first task (of these 20 overlapped with the second task), 10 
critical lures, 10 non-presented and related words and 10 non-presented and unrelated words 
that were also presented in the second task, and another 10 non-presented and unrelated 
words that were completely new. The words were displayed as visual representations 
containing a blur filter that became clearer over time. We included 10 gradual gradations of 
blurs (see Appendix). Each blur was presented for 1 s. The PCT task measured a button press 
response from participants as soon as the words were recognized. After the button press, a 
pop-up window appeared in which participants had to write the word they had seen in a self-
paced manner.   
Design and Procedure 
A 2 (Type: false memory vs. hits) x 2 (Valence: neutral vs. negative) within-subject 
design was used. Participants were tested individually and were presented with all three tasks 
in the same order in a 40-45 minute session. First, participants were shown 5 neutral and 5 
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negative DRM word lists that they had to remember. The order of this was counterbalanced. 
Next, participants engaged in the recognition task in which words were subsequently 
presented and they were required to digitally input whether they recognized the words from 
the first task, by typing in “yes” or “no”. Finally, participants engaged in the perceptual 
closure task, during which they were required to press a button as soon as they recognized the 
blurred words that were subsequently presented, followed by digitally typing what they 
believed the word should be. Input results and reaction times were measured using the E-
Prime 2.0 software. In between each task participants were given a filler task (i.e., play Tetris 
for five minutes).  
Results and Discussion 
Perceptual Closure Task 
 Hits vs. false memories We start by reporting the most important findings of 
our experiment. The reaction time data are reported in milliseconds (i.e., ms). When we 
analyzed the reaction times of the hits and false memories, we employed the following 
procedure for our analysis. First, for exploratory reasons, we filtered the data and removed 
cases that were incorrectly recognized in the perceptual closure task. That is, they pressed the 
button indicating that they recognized the word (e.g., bake), but then filled in an incorrect 
response (i.e., lake). No significant interaction between Type and Valence was detected (F(1, 
42) = 0.38, p = .54, ƞpartial² = .01). We did find a significant main effect of Valence. That is, 
neutral items (hits: M = 5116, SD = 714; false memory: M = 4541, SD = 848) were solved 
faster on the perceptual closure task compared to negative items (hits: M = 5301, SD = 726; 
false memory: M = 4819, SD = 882; F(1, 42) = 10.83, p = .002, ƞpartial² = .21). More 
interestingly, we found that participants were faster at solving degraded stimuli representing 
false memories than hits (main effect Type: F(1, 42) = 40.77, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .49).  
In our final analysis, we excluded the cases that were incorrectly recognized in the 
recognition task (i.e., for studied items: saying “yes” to words that were not presented and 
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saying “no” to words that were presented; for critical lures, only “yes” responses to critical 
lures were included) and perceptual closure task.1 Again, we found no evidence for a 
significant Type x Valence interaction (F(1, 42) = 0.23, p = .63, ƞpartial² = .005). We did find a 
main effect of Valence (F(1, 42) = 11.93, p = .001, ƞpartial² = .22), with neutral items (hits: M 
= 4866, SD = 822; false memory: M = 4453, SD = 937) being recognized significantly faster 
than negative items (hits: M = 5301, SD = 726; false memory: M = 4819, SD = 882). Also, 
results showed that false memories were significantly faster than hits (main effect Type: F(1, 
42) = 11.88, p = .001, ƞpartial² = .22; see Figure 1). On average, this indicates that false 
memories were detected at the fifth blur filter, while hits were recognized on average at the 
sixth filter.  
(Un)related We also included unrelated (old and new) and related items in the 
perceptual closure task. When we performed a repeated measures ANOVA on all different 
memory categories (Type: hits, false memory, related, unrelated (old), and unrelated (new), a 
significant effect of Type appeared (F(4, 168) = 32.48, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .44). Post-hoc 
analyses using Bonferroni correction showed that solution speeds were significantly faster for 
false memories than for any of the other memory categories (all ps < .05). More importantly, 
related, and unrelated new items were significantly slower solved than hits and false 
memories (all ps < .001). Solution rates for unrelated old items were significantly higher than 
for false memories (p < .001; see Figure 2).  
Hits and False recognition 
 A 2 (Type: Hits vs. false memory) x 2 (Valence: Neutral vs. negative) repeated 
measures ANOVA on hits and false recognition was conducted. No significant effects 
emerged (all ps > .05). 
This experiment showed that when using a perceptual closure task, identifications 
based on false memories were statistically faster than those based on true memories. This is 
in line with the idea that false memories might serve as better primes to solve problems. 
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However, although these results are promising, two lingering issues need to be addressed. 
First, the inclusion of a recognition task might have affected our findings as participants 
might have processed critical lures and presented items differently on this task thereby 
leading to carry-over effects on the perceptual closure task. Howe and colleagues (2011) have 
addressed this issue before and they did not find that an intervening memory test influenced 
their false memory-priming effects (see also Howe, Threadgold, Wilkinson, Garner, & Ball, 
in press). Nonetheless, because we used a new paradigm to test the positive consequences of 
false memories (i.e., perceptual closure), it is possible that our effects might have been due to 
the use of an intervening recognition task. Second, our results are silent about the possibility 
that critical lures could differ in important ways from presented items thereby resulting in our 
observed effects.  
To tackle these issues, we conducted a second experiment. Participants were 
randomly assigned to groups in which they received or did not receive a recognition task. 
Furthermore, participants received the same DRM lists as in Experiment 1 or were presented 
with DRM lists in which critical lures that we used in Experiment 1 were now included as 
part of presented items during the DRM list presentation and in which certain presented items 
in Experiment 1 were now used as critical lures (see Method section). In this way, we could 
examine whether our effects were due to the nature of false memories or of the characteristics 
of critical lures.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
 In this experiment, 80 undergraduate participants (mean age = 21.27, SD = 1.76; 7 
male students2) were involved. They were recruited from classes taught by the Faculty of 
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht University. They received a financial 
compensation for their participation (7.50 euro). 
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Materials and Tasks 
 In the control procedure, participants received the same DRM lists as in Experiment 
1. However, in the adapted condition, participants received modified DRM lists. That is, in 
these lists, the critical lure was replaced with the first or second word in the list (i.e., from 5 
lists the first word was changed and from the other 5 the second word was replaced). These 
words acted in the adapted lists as critical lures and the previous lures served as presented 
items.  
Design and Procedure 
 The present study made use of a 2 (Condition: Standard vs. Adapted) x 2 
(Recognition task: Yes vs. No) x 2 (Valence: Neutral vs. Negative) split-plot design with the 
latter factor being a within-subjects variable. Participants were randomly assigned to the 4 
different groups (n = 20 in each group).  
 A roughly similar procedure as in Experiment 1 was followed except that half of the 
participants did not receive a recognition task and received after the DRM wordlist 
presentation first a filler task (Tetris for five minutes) and then the perceptual closure task. 
Also, half of the participants were presented with the adapted DRM lists.  
Results and Discussion 
Perceptual Closure Task  
 Studied items vs. critical lures. Because half of the participants did not receive a 
recognition task, meaning that we had no knowledge concerning their memory performance, 
the terms “hits” are changed to “studied items” and “false memory” to “critical lures.” We 
performed a 2 (Condition: Standard vs. Adapted) x 2 (Recognition task: Yes vs. No) x 2 
(Valence: Neutral vs. Negative) mixed ANOVA on our data. Again, we filtered our data3 and 
excluded cases in which participants did not have a false memory on the recognition task 
(i.e., this could only be done on one half of the participants as only one half received a 
recognition task) and in which participants incorrectly recognized items on the perceptual 
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closure task (see above). We did not conduct the exploratory analysis in which we only 
filtered the data removing incorrect responses on the PCT. Experiment 1 showed that this 
exploratory analysis did not provide extra information above the final analysis. We found a 
statistically significant four-way interaction (F(1, 72) = 8.48, p = .005, ƞpartial² = .11; 4 
missing values). Simple effects revealed the following (see also Table 1).  
Our results were generally in line with what we found in Experiment 1. Specifically, 
in the group where participants received the standard DRM lists and irrespective of receiving 
a recognition task or not, critical lures were statistically faster recognized than studied items 
on the perceptual closure task (F(1, 38) = 19.67, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .34). For the participants 
that received the adapted DRM lists, results were slightly different. That is, in the recognition 
task group, critical lures were again faster recognized relative to studied items (F(1, 15) = 
29.42, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .66). In the group in which participants did not receive any 
recognition task, only neutral critical lures were statistically faster recognized than neutral 
studied items (F(1, 19) = 38.33, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .67) 
(Un)related items. A 2 (Condition: Standard vs. Adapted) x 2 (Recognition task: Yes 
vs. No) mixed ANOVA on the different memory categories (studied items, critical lures, 
related, unrelated) was also conducted. We found a statistically significant two-way 
interaction (F(3, 225) = 6.69, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .08). For the group receiving a recognition 
task, we again found that critical lures served as better primes relative to the other memory 
categories (F(3, 111) = 56.70, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .61). In the group that was not presented 
with a recognition task, studied items from the adapted lists (M = 5201, SD = 723) and 
critical lures from the adapted lists (M = 5132, SD = 747) did not statistically differ from each 
other (p > .05). For the control lists, critical lures were faster recognized than the other 
memory categories (F(3, 57) = 152.65, p < .001, ƞpartial² = .89). 
Hits and False recognition 
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We also examined whether hit rates and false recognition rates differed between the 
control and adapted lists. Of course, we could only examine this for the participants receiving 
the recognition task (n = 40). A 2 (List: Control vs. adapted) x 2 (Valence: Neutral vs. 
negative) mixed ANOVA was conducted separately on hit rates and false recognition rates. 
For hit rates, we found the following. No significant interaction emerged (F(1, 38) = 0.15, p 
= .70, ƞpartial² = .004). We did find that the control lists resulted in statistically higher hit rates 
(F(1, 38) = 8.17, p = .007, ƞpartial² = .18; M = 0.72, SD = 0.16) than the adapted ones (M = 
0.64, SD = 0.19). No valence effect emerged (p > .05). For the false recognition, no 
statistically significant interaction was detected (F(1, 38) = 1.67, p = .21, ƞpartial² = .04). Our 
results did reveal a statistically significant list effect (F(1, 38) = 6.75, p = .01, ƞpartial² = .15) 
with more false memories being produced for the adapted (M = 0.87, SD = 0.18) than the 
control lists (M = 0.73, SD = 0.24). No valence effect was detected (p > .05).  
The findings from Experiment 2 nicely show that even when participants were not 
presented with a recognition task or critical lures were replaced with presented items, critical 
lures (i.e., false memories) served as more efficient primes to correctly recognize degraded 
stimuli than studied items. Although on certain occasions, studied items and critical lures did 
differ in terms of solution rates, the overall pattern is that false memories are processed faster 
than true recollections. These findings are in line with previous research showing that an 
intervening memory test did not mitigate the observed false memory-priming effects (Howe 
et al., 2011, in press).  
We also found that false memories were more easily elicited for participants receiving 
the adapted than the standard DRM lists. One reason for this finding might be that the 
switching of critical lures and presented items with each other resulted in new lists in which 
the associative links from the presented items to the new critical lures became stronger and 
hence, resulted in more false memories (Roediger et al., 2001). This finding did not likely 
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affect our PCT results as we found in both the control and adapted lists and for those who 
received the recognition task that critical lures were recognized faster than hits.  
For the participants that received the adapted lists but no recognition task, we only 
found that neutral critical lures were recognized faster than neutral studied items. Although 
we have no clear explanation for this result, one reason might lie in the use of the adapted 
lists. That is, we found that for those participants that did receive a recognition test, hit rates 
were lower for the adapted than for the control lists. This means that the production of true 
memories is lower for adapted than the control lists. This could imply that for the group that 
was not presented with the recognition task, chances were even lower that true and false 
memories of the lists would develop. If true and false memories are less likely to develop, 
then this might affect the PCT performance resulting in that only neutral critical lures were 
faster recognized than neutral studied items. Of course, this remains speculative and future 
studies could dig into why neutral material is more likely to find this false memory priming 
effect when no recognition task is provided.  
General Discussion 
Our experiments were centered on the issue of whether false memories might have 
beneficial outcomes on tasks related to measures of intelligence. We used an adapted 
perceptual closure task as a rough analogue of a commonly used subtask of intelligence (i.e., 
picture completion). We found that when participants were presented with word lists known 
to engender robust levels of false memories, perceptual closure problems based on false 
memories were solved significantly faster than those based on true memories. This finding 
presents a novel contribution to the growing literature on adaptive memory, one that shows 
that false memories might be even better for problem-solving tasks linked to intelligence than 
true memories (see Otgaar & Howe, 2014).   
In our first experiment, participants were first presented with DRM lists and then 
received a recognition task. Finally, they had to, as quickly as possible, identify degraded 
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pictures of DRM words. That our finding was robust can be seen in the fact that in our two 
filtered data sets, false memories consistently served as faster primes in solving the 
perceptual closure problem than did true memories. What this shows, perhaps 
counterintuitively, is that false memories are superior to true ones when solving certain 
complex problems. This result corresponds with recent research that also revealed that false 
memories were more effective in problem solutions than true memories (Howe et al., 2013). 
The reliability of our core finding can also be traced back to our results showing that false 
memories were solved faster than even unrelated and related items. Thus, our effect can be 
solely attributed to processes associated with false memories.  
Even more, we also conducted a second experiment in which we examined whether 
the inclusion of a recognition task might have affected our results. In general, we still found 
that false memories had faster solution rates than hits. Also, when we used adapted DRM lists 
in which critical lures were replaced with presented items thereby creating new critical lures, 
we overall found that false memories served as the most efficient primes. If the adapted lists 
or the exclusion of a recognition test did have any effects on solution rates, then these 
changes might have only resulted in no statistical differences between hits and false 
memories in terms of solution rates in a minority of cases.   
What might be the reason that complex problems are faster disentangled by false than 
true memories? According to Howe et al. (2013), one potential explanation for the superiority 
of false memories in priming solutions on complex problems is that false memories are self-
generated and that self-generated information (i.e., spontaneous false memories) is better 
retained than other-generated information (i.e., experimenter-presented true memories; 
Howe, Wilkinson, & Monaghan, 2012). If priming effects are mainly attributed to the 
strength of a memory representation, then one might indeed expect false memories being 
more advantageous in solving problems relative to true memories.  
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What mechanism(s) might underlie the salutary consequences of false memories? 
Since our findings are closely related to studies showing that false memories facilitate 
performance on explicit and implicit memory tasks (McDermott, 1997; McKone & Murphy, 
2000), we propose that a likely candidate could be spreading activation (Anderson, 1983; 
Howe, Wimmer, Gagnon, & Plumpton, 2009; Otgaar, Howe, Peters, Sauerland, & 
Raymaekers, 2013; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo, 2001). That is, the interpretation 
of false memory priming effects is that studied items, through associative activation, trigger 
false recollections that can also influence performance on other related tasks. This idea can be 
directly applied to our findings as well. That is, it is probable that the encoding of studied 
items resulted in the activation of non-presented items (i.e., false memories) and that this 
spreading activation impacts other related tasks (e.g., picture completion). Specifically, 
spreading activation theories postulate that when studied items are encoded, activation 
spreads rapidly and automatically to interrelated nodes designating non-presented items (i.e., 
critical lures; Howe et al., 2009). What we argue is that when such nodes are activated and 
self-generated, their activation levels may impact activation levels of other domains that are 
linked to memory. In our experiment, this domain referred to identifying degraded stimuli; a 
domain intimately related to memory performance.  
We also found that perceptual closure problems based on neutral false memories were 
solved faster than negative false memories. Although this might be seen in contrast with the 
study by Howe and colleagues (2013) who found survival-related false memories to be better 
primes than neutral ones, it does resemble research showing that survival-related information 
material is more likely to give rise to memory aberrations than negative and neutral 
information (e.g., Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar, Howe, Smeets, & Garner, 2014). Research 
suggests that negative information contains more interrelated concepts relative to neutral 
information (Talmi, Luk, McGarry, & Moscovitch, 2007) and this could imply that there is 
more spreading activation and that it takes longer to solve problems that are negative in 
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nature. Furthermore, although survival-related material might often include negatively-
laden details (e.g., death), this is not necessarily always the case. Survival-related information 
can also refer to other types of more mundane details (e.g., blind; see Howe et al., 2013). 
That is, any type of information that might have direct consequences for your survival and 
reproductive success could be regarded as fitness-relevant.  
One could argue that our problem-solving task is a far stretch from being a rough 
equivalent of a picture completion that is often used in intelligence tasks. Of course, it is 
undeniable that a standard picture completion test varies on many dimensions compared to 
ours. However, it is our contention that the most important characteristic of picture 
completion tests is the presentation of degraded stimuli and the identification of these stimuli. 
It is obvious that our adapted perceptual closure meets this important demand. Nonetheless, 
future research could, for example, examine whether DRM lists consisting of pictures instead 
of words could still lead to positive consequences of false memories. 
Practical implications 
Our findings have important implications. Our study provides novel evidence that 
false memories can have beneficial outcomes on tasks known to tap intelligence. Our 
experiment thereby supplements the rapidly increasing field of research showing that our 
memory and its illusions have functional properties. Previous research on the positive effects 
of false memories has sometimes been criticized by using tasks that were highly related to the 
DRM procedure (Howe et al., 2014). In our experiments, we however used a task (perceptual 
closure task) that in which the responses were probably not so much based on associative 
processes such as in CRATs but more in the identification of degraded stimuli. .  
Also, our experiments dovetail nicely with recent research showing that false 
memories induced by suggestion can have negative or positive behavioral consequences. In 
these studies, participants received false feedback suggesting that in their childhood they 
became sick after eating a specific food. The main message of these studies is that inducing 
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false memories for food-related experiences (e.g., getting sick after eating egg salad) can 
lead to decreased consumption of that particular food (Bernstein & Loftus, 2009). 
Interestingly, it has even been shown that this false feedback procedure can also lead to 
positive consequences. That is, in a study conducted by Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakefield, 
and Loftus (2008), participants were falsely suggested that they loved asparagus the first time 
they tried it when they were a child. This positive false feedback made participants who 
believed in the false suggestion more likely to prefer asparagus and pay more for it at a 
grocery story. It nicely shows that on a general level, false memories, both spontaneous and 
suggestion-induced, do not only have a downside, but depending on the context can also lead 
to salutary effects.  
Of course, it is a far stretch to argue that our findings can be directly transferred to a 
real life situation. Although the current work and previous work by Howe and colleagues 
(2013, in press) indicate that false memories can rapidly prime solutions on tasks that are not 
directly linked to the DRM procedure (i.e., perceptual closure, analogies), it is true that in 
real life situations, certain types of false memories can often have drastic consequences. 
Think about the following. You are reading a book about the Second World War and you will 
be examined about the contents of this book. During the reading, you spontaneously think 
about related, but false, details of the book (e.g., that Italy was part of the allied forces). 
When you are examined about the contents of the book and the teacher coincidentally asks a 
question about the allied forces, you might incorrectly recall that Italy was part of them.  
Nonetheless, there are real life examples in which certain types of false memories 
might be beneficial. For example, imagine that a 12-year-old boy looks at a photograph in 
which he was carrying a soccer ball when he was 4 years old. The child then imagined what 
happened and misremembers that he loved to play soccer when he was 4 years old. During 
gym at school, the teacher asks what the children enjoy doing in the gym class. The boy then 
erroneously responds that he loves soccer that might ultimately lead to more exercise in this 
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sport. Interestingly, such an example can easily be tested. Using the false feedback 
approach and using doctored photographs falsely depicting the participants with a ball 
(Wade, Garry, Read, & Lindsay, 2002), participants might be led to falsely remember that 
they were good at a certain sport which might lead to more interest in that particular sport.  
There are also examples that illustrate the positive consequences of other types of 
false memories, ones that are more related to the findings observed in the current 
experiments. We have previously reported that false memories based on more associative 
processes might be adaptive in survival-related contexts (Otgaar & Howe, 2014). For 
example, imagine that someone is in a possibly dangerous situation. That is, there are obvious 
signs of nearby predators (e.g., fresh animal tracks). The person who incorrectly associates 
seeing the predator and thus, falsely recollects witnessing the predator is less likely to visit 
that location and more likely to survive (Howe & Derbish, 2010; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010). 
Taken together, although it is undeniably true that false memories are harmful in a plethora of 
situations, there are circumstances in which false memories might have positive 
consequences as well. What makes this issue appealing is that many of these examples can be 
experimentally tested (e.g., doctored videos) and future research should therefore focus on 
the investigation of the positive effects of false memories using a wide array of paradigms 
and situations.  
Interestingly, the view that false memories can have positive consequences is 
intrinsically related to the work on the adaptive nature of memory and false memory. 
Recently, there is considerable interest in the adaptive value of memory (Howe & Otgaar, 
2013; Nairne, Thompson, & Pandeirada, 2007). This work shows that memory can be 
superior under conditions that trigger survival-related processing. For example, when 
participants are asked to imagine a survival-relevant situation (i.e., stranded on the grasslands 
of a foreign country) and asked to rate a list of unrelated words for their relevance to that 
scenario, performance on subsequent memory tests show better retention of those concepts 
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than ones rated for non-survival scenarios (Nairne & Pandeirada, 2008; see various 
chapters in Schwartz, Howe, Toglia, & Otgaar, 2014).  
The work on adaptive memory comes close to earlier conceptualizations on memory 
in which was suggested that both true and false memories originate from the adaptive nature 
of human cognition (Johnson & Raye, 1998). In this view, the efficient and rapid way of how 
our memory works frequently comes at a cost in that errors are produced as well. Still, such 
memory errors are likely to provide critical information about the functioning of memory 
(Roediger, 1996). For example, the finding that the encoding of related information produces 
false recollections of non-related details tells us that processes such as spreading activation 
might be actively involved in the encoding, storage, and retrieval of memory traces.  
Intriguingly, this work on adaptive memory spurred the idea that false memories 
might have adaptive and positive consequences too. This idea was mainly catalyzed by 
findings demonstrating that survival processing not only heightened true memory 
performance, but also elevated false memory performance in both children and adults (Otgaar 
et al., 2014; Otgaar & Smeets, 2010; see also Howe & Derbish, 2010). These findings 
suggested that false memories are not simple by-products of a flexible memory system, but, 
like true memories, may have positive effects including guiding future behaviors and being 
related to creativity (Dewhurst, Thorley, Hammond, & Ormerod, 2011; Howe, 2011; 
Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011). Although one might argue that such an interpretation 
is unlikely, it parallels work on the adaptive nature of misbeliefs where it has been suggested 
that false beliefs may have evolved to serve positive purposes (McKay & Dennett, 2009). 
Conclusion 
 To recap, our findings have the potential to revise the default assumption that false 
memories are intrinsically sinister and can lead only to wrongful convictions. Our results 
contribute to a more balanced view about memory in which it becomes clear that the 
reconstructive nature of memory ultimately leads to false memories and that the context in 
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which false memories surface determines whether these memory errors are considered 
positive or negative. 
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Footnote 
1Filtering took place on item level. In the filtering process of the recognition data, 845 items 
of a total of 3354 items were deleted (43 participants x 78 items). For the PCT data, 235 
items were incorrectly recognized deleted from a total of 3340 (43 x 80).  
2No ages were recorded from 36 participants 
3For the recognition data, 607 items of a total of 3120 items (40 x 79) were deleted. We 
deleted also 252 items from the PCT data (total of 6400 items).  
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Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of studied items and critical lures as a function of 
Valence, Condition, and Recognition task (Experiment 2).  
 Studied items Critical lures 
Neutral Negative Neutral Negative 
Control RT yes 5054 (358) 5219 (332) 4271 (775) 5010 (871) 
RT no 5023 (544) 5092 (439) 4781 (679) 4869 (653) 
Adapted RT yes 4883 (549) 5054 (365) 3745 (874) 4320 (870) 
RT no 5306 (789) 5039 (770) 4723 (936)  5653 (901)  
Note: RT = Recognition task.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
False Memory 
 
 
Figure 1. Reaction times of the different memory categories (false memory and hits) as a 
function of valence (errors bars represent standard error of mean (SEM)) 
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Figure 2. Reaction times of the different memory categories (errors bars represent standard 
error of mean (SEM)) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
False Memory 31 
 
 
Appendix 
Example of degraded visual representatation of the words in the perceptual closure 
task (brood =  bread)  
 
 
 
                   
 
